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The purpose of this paper is to survey a 
portion of the experimental psychology 
literature; viz., reports of experiments con­
cerning choice and decision making under 
uncertainty. Even within this area the 
coverage will be far from complete-the 
idea being to treat only work which is 
both likely to be of interest to economists 
and to be unfamiliar to them. 
The discussion which follows will be 
directed towards three main points. First, 
the behavioral regularities reported by 
psychologists are real, well documented, 
and replicatable. Thus, if it is said that "in­
dividuals in situation x exhibit behaviory," 
then in general one can be sure that a large 
number of people have been placed in the 
given situation and have performed as indi­
cated. Second, much of this work seems to 
indicate that the behavioral assumptions 
employed by economists are simply wrong. 
For instance, choices between gambles are 
frequently inconsistent. In gaming situa­
tions individuals consistently do not adopt 
obvious optimal strategies. There are 
substantial and systematic biases in the per­
ception of uncertainty. Also, individuals 
use information inefficiently; in particular, 
Bayes' rule fails as a descriptive model. For 
a discussion of why economists should be 
concerned by these results see the author 
and Charles Plott. Third, while these 
results in principle could apply to the sorts 
of choices dealt with in economic models, it 
is not as yet established that they do. In 
fact, in some cases close analysis of the ex­
perimental setting suggests that the results 
reported are precisely those predicted by 
conventional economic theory. 
I. Probability Learning Experiments 
Of all the work in experimental 
psychology, probably the work best known 
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to economists is that dealing with 
"probability learning." Though the details 
of the experiments vary, the basic idea is 
standard. A subject is shown a sequence of 
Bernoulli trials, and prior to each t1ial the 
subject is asked to predict the outcome of 
the next trial. In spite of differences in ex­
perimental design the behavior observed is 
generally the same: given a sequence of 
trials in which the events occur with 
probabilities p and I - p. a subject at­
tempting to predict each trial will tend to 
predict the two events in proportions p and 
I - p. That is, the relative frequency of the 
subje ct' s p r e d i c t i o n s  match the 
probabilities of the events being predicted, 
though the optimal strategy is to always 
predict the most likely outcome. (See for 
example Lee Roy Beach et al.) 
Morris Fiorina, who surveys the prior 
work, notes that in most of the experiments 
the trials were randomized within blocks, 
and the observed behavior is quite reason­
able once this dependence is taken into ac­
count. Thus, the probability learning ex­
periments provide little evidence against 
optimizing behavior. As Fiorina says, "If 
anything, subjects' perceptions of the state 
of the experimental world are more ac­
curate than those of the experimenters" (p. 
164). 
II. Bayes' Rule and Related Matters
The experiments discussed in this section 
deal with the way individuals process in­
formation concerning uncertainty. One of 
the major questions studied is whether or 
not subjects revise their beliefs in accord 
with Bayes' rule. A large number of experi­
ments have been reported and the general 
finding is that people either do not revise 
their opinions in that fashion, or if they do, 
they do not use the correct "objective" 
probabilities in their calculations. 
Many laboratory experiments of the 
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b o o k - b a g  p o k e r - c h i p  v a r i e t y  have 
demonstrated what has been called conser­
vatism (see Wesley DuCharme; Beach and 
James Wise; Ward Edwards; C. R. 
Peterson, DuCharme, and Edwards). There 
is a tendency to treat probabilities near zero 
or one as being too close to one-half while 
probabilities near one-half tend to be cor­
rectly measured. This behavior does not 
appear to be replicatable outside of labora­
tory surroundings and many of the rules of 
thumb and heuristics individuals use seem 
to have the opposite effect (see Baruch 
Fischhoff; W. C. Howells, 1971, 1972; Paul 
Slovic, Fischhoff, and Sarah Lichten­
stein). 
One of the more striking examples which 
suggests that Bayes' rule is not a good 
descriptive model was reported by Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1973) and 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974). Eighty-five 
subjects were given the following instruc­
tions: 
"A panel of psychologists have in­
terviewed and administered per­
sonality tests to 30 engineers and 70 
lawyers, all successful in their fields. 
On the basis of this information, 
thumbnail descriptions of the 30 
engineers and 70 lawyers have been 
written. You will find on your forms 
five descriptions chosen at random 
from the JOO available. For each 
description, please indicate your 
probability that the person described is 
an engineer on a scale of 0 to l 00." 
[1973, p. 241] 
Another group of eighty-six subjects was 
given identical instructions except that the 
number of lawyers was changed to thirty 
and the number of engineers to seventy. 
Both groups were given the same five 
descriptions to judge, and then the follow­
ing: "Suppose now that you are given no 
information whatsoever about an individual 
chosen at random from the sample. The 
probability that this man is one of the 30 
[70] engineers in the sample of l 00 is 
_%" ( 1973, p. 241). 
The results reported certainly do not con­
form to Bayes' rule. Both groups of sub­
jects gave nearly the same posterior 
probabilities for each of the five descrip­
tions in spite of the substantial change in 
the priors. This agreement was definitely 
not due to conservatism or a tendency to 
give probabilities equal to the prior 
probabilities. In fact for one of the five 
descriptions the median estimate of the 
probability that the man chosen was an 
engineer was around .05 for both groups of 
subjects and, for another of the descrip­
tions, was around .95. In addition both 
groups made the "correct" response to the 
question quoted above. Perhaps the 
strangest result reported was the response 
to the following: "Dick is a thirty-year-old 
man. He is married with no children. A man 
of high ability and high motivation he 
promises to be quite successful in his field. 
He is well liked by his colleagues" ( 1973, p. 
242). This description was intended to be 
neutral and apparently was judged so by the 
subjects. For both groups the median esti­
mate was .50. Thus these subjects 
evaluated useless information and no in­
formation quite differently. 
The hypothesis being explored in this 
work is that individuals make predictions 
based upon representativeness, and the 
descriptions presented were designed to 
test this idea. For example, one of the five 
descriptions was: "Jack is a forty-five-year­
old man. He is married and has four 
children. He is generally conservative, 
careful, and ambitious. He shows no 
interest in political and social issues and 
spends most of his free time on his many 
hobbies which include carpentry, sailing, 
and mathematical puzzles. The probability 
that Jack is one of the 30 [70] engineers in 
the sample of 100 is_%" (1973, p. 241). 
The results presented certainly do support 
the hypothesis that individuals judge by 
something like representativeness and ig­
nore prior probabilities. The responses to 
the vacuous description and the fact that 
the subjects were reminded of the prior 
odds after each description was given are 
especially convincing. Nevertheless, this 
experiment has features that make the ap­
plicability of the findings to economic deci­
sions doubtful. First, as is often the case, 
the subjects are not told the truth about the 
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random process being examined. Clearly, 
the thumbnail descriptions were not a 
random sample from the alleged popula­
tion. The subjects' responses would agree 
with Bayes' rule only if they either "played 
the game" or believed the experimental 
instructions and thereby badly mis­
perceived what was going on. Second, 
there is the difficulty of controlling the in­
formation given when verbal descriptions 
or situations are presented. Both of these 
difficulties could be taken care of by the use 
of actual balls in urns or book-bag poker­
chip set ups. 
For example, suppose one has two urns, 
one with four red balls and two white balls, 
and another urn with three of each color. A 
known randomizing device, possibly 
another urn or a spinner, could serve as a 
prior for choosing which urn to draw from. 
Suppose that samples of size six are drawn 
from one of the urns (with replacement of 
course). The representativeness hypothesis 
would seem to indicate that for samples 
composed of four red balls and two white 
balls, or three of each color, the estimated 
posterior odds should favor the indicated 
urn by more than the correct odds. 
Finally there is also the question of in­
centives; it is not clear that Kahneman and 
Tversky's subjects had a positive incentive 
to give "correct" answers. The instruc­
tions included the following statement: 
"The same task has been performed by a 
panel of experts, who are highly accurate in 
assigning probability to the various descrip­
tions. You will be paid a bonus to the extent 
that your estimates come close to those of 
the expert panel" (1973, p. 241). Thus there 
was an incentive to behave as the 
"experts" which may or may not be in­
terpreted as attempting to give the right 
answer. In the ball-urn experiment, incen­
tives can be handled by asking the subjects 
to guess which urn produced the sample 
and paying off if they guess correctly. 
In fact I have run these types of experi­
ments using economics students from 
several universities. The results suggest 
that the representativeness heuristic 
describes very well the behavior of 
financially unmotivated subjects and of 
financially motivated but inexperienced 
subjects. On the other hand the behavior of 
experienced subjects whose payments 
depend upon their decisions appears to be 
consistent with Bayes' theorem. 
The difficulty of controlling the informa­
tion conveyed in verbal presentations is 
shown by M. Hammerton. Ten subjects 
were given the following information: 
" I. A device has been invented for 
screening a population for a 
disease known as psylicrapitis. 
2. The device is a very good one, but
not perfect.
3. If someone is a sufferer, there is a
90 percent chance that he will be
recorded positively.
4. If he is not a sufferer, there is a I
percent chance he will be
recorded positively.
5. Roughly I percent of the popula­
tion has the disease.
6. Mr. Smith has been tested and the
result is positive. The chance that
he is in fact a sufferer is: 
-· ... " [p. 252] 
The median response was 85 percent with 
an interquartile range of IO percent. Only 
one of the ten subjects underestimated the 
probability (which is around one half ). 
Fourteen groups of eight subjects were 
given the same information except that the 
order of statements 3, 4, and 5 was varied 
and sometimes certain of them dropped. 
The results of those experiments are sum­
marized in Table I. While it is not clear just 
how the subjects are determining their 
probability estimates, it certainly is clear 
that they are not being conservative and are 
not using Bayes' rule. 
Finally a group of twenty subjects 
(housewives) was given a reworded version 
of statements 1 through 6. Statement I was 
changed to read: "A device has been in­
vented for screening engine parts for 
internal cracks" (1973, p. 253). The remain­
ing statements were altered accordingly. 
For the group the median p was 60 percent, 
the interquartile range was 40 percent and 
seven subjects underestimated. Comparing 
this latter group with the population 
reported in Table 1 showed that the dif­
ference in the median was significant at the 
.001 level. 
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TABLE I 
Presentation Number 
for Median p of 
Group Statements 3.4,5 Estimate Underestimates 
I 3.4,5 .85 I 
2 3,5.4 .86 0 
J 4,3,5 .85 I 
4 4,5,J .82 2 
5 5,3,4 .80 I 
6 5,4,3 .80 I 
7 4,5 .75 2 
8 3,5 .80 I 
9 3,4 .75 0 
IO J .75 I 
II 4 .90 2 
12 5 .85 2 
13 .75 I 
14 3.4.5 .85 0 
Source: M. Hammerton. 
Kahneman and Tversky present addi­
tional evidence in favor of the representa­
tiveness hypothesis and for other heuristics 
also, and some quite convincing evidence 
that many truths of mathematical statistics 
are not intuitive concepts even to indi­
viduals trained in these concepts (see also 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1971). In 
particular, regression effects (for example, 
sampling based upon the value of the de­
pendent variable) and sampling variability 
are often misunderstood. For a survey of 
the psychological literature see Slovic, 
Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein. Louis Wilde 
provides a survey of the evidence concern­
ing the behavior of consumers. 
III. Inconsistency in Choice 
There is a substantial amount of evidence 
that in certain types of situations people 
make choices which are in some sense in­
c ons  i s  t e n t .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h o u g h  
economists almost always assume tran­
sitivity of individual preference orderings, 
psychologists have found experimental 
setups that lead some individuals to choose 
intransitively. In a classic paper Tversky 
demonstrated that certain individuals will 
persistently demonstrate intransitivity. 
Consider the following pair of gambles. 
A: with probability .99 win $4.00; 
with probability .01 lose $1.00. 
B: with probability .33 win $16.00; 
with probability .67 lose $2.00. 
Note that the expected values of these gam­
bles differ by only one cent. There is an im­
pressive amount of experimental evidence 
that suggests that the behavior described 
below is not only possible but indeed quite 
common. 
An individual is allowed to choose one of 
the two gambles and knows that he will 
play the gamble of his choice. In this situa­
tion he chooses gamble A. Instead of being 
asked which gamble he "likes the best," he 
is asked how much he would pay for gam­
ble A and how much for gamble B. He 
knows that he will pay the higher of the two 
bids and then play the gamble he has 
bought. In this situation his bids will not be 
"unreasonable," that is, he will not bid 
more than $4 for A or more than $16 for B, 
but his bid for B will be higher than his bid 
for A. Alternatively, if the individual had 
been given the rights to play the gambles 
and had been interrogated as to how much 
he would sell them for, his responses again 
would be reasonable and would indicate a 
preference for gamble B. In sum, this 
person would choose A over B, pay more 
for B than for A, and would be willing to sell 
A at a lesser price than B. 
Lichtenstein and Slovic presented 173 
subjects with twelve pairs of bets similar to 
that shown above. In each pair one bet had 
a high probability of winning (P bet) a small 
amount and the other had a smaller 
probability of winning a large amount ($ 
bet). The subjects were asked for each pair 
which they preferred and later were asked 
to give selling prices. All bets were 
hypothetical. For 73 percent of the subjects 
"for every pair in which the P bet was 
chosen, the $ bet later received a higher 
bid" (p. 48). In a second experiment 74 sub­
jects were asked to give their choices and 
buying prices. The rate of reversals was 
lower than in the previous case, but still 
significant. As before, all the bets were 
hypothetical. In order to verify that the 
phenomenon was not due to a lack of incen­
tives, a third experiment was conducted in 
which the bets were played. The subjects 
(14) made choices and subsequently gave 
selling prices for the various gambles. 
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These basic results have been replicated, 
including once at a Las Vegas casino 
(Lichenstein and Slavic; Harold Lindman). 
Economic theory suggests a number of 
explanations (income effects, misspecified 
incentives, etc.) which could explain the 
observed behavior. It is possible, however, 
to design experiments that avoid these 
difficulties. The author and Plott report the 
results of two such experiments, and to our 
surprise we replicated the psychologists' 
results. It should be noted that the gambles 
used were especially selected to produce 
the intransitivity observed, and it is not 
claime.d that the behavior applies generally 
or that it would be persistent in the money 
pump sense. 
In conclusion many of the results 
reported by experimental psychologists 
should be of interest to economists. In 
some cases the results obtained raise 
serious questions concerning the descrip­
tive validity of a number of the behavioral 
assumptions used in economic models. In 
many instances, however, the reported be­
havior is consistent with economic theory, 
and much of this literature can be seen as 
showing the power of the economists' 
model of economic agents. 
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